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Diaspora communities have the potential to 
Voice in 
and hostland politics, as well as a role in the arena as non-state 
actors thanks to their transnational capacities. In today's world, 
many diaspora groups have started acting to interest or lobby groups 
and civil society organisations. They mobilise try to influence policy makers 
both in the host- and in the homeland. They an impact on their homeland's 
policies through their support for, or opposition governments, and by providing 
financial and/or political support to social "'"'v,.,m,.nt" political parties and civil 
society organisations (Shuval, 2000; Vertovec I , Demmers, 2007; Baser and 
Swain, 2008). 
The Kurdish diaspora is one of the most used examples for diasporas 
which try to affect policy-making "'"'"h<onic,md in home and host countries 
by mobilising and acting transnationally for cause. Kurds constitute one 
of the largest stateless diasporas in the world Bruinessen, 2000; Khayati, 
2008) and the Kurdish diaspora is one of the visible and active diasporas in 
Europe. Whilst no reliable census of the Kurdish lation in Europe has been 
undertaken, according to the most widely acc:epte:a estimates there are nearly 2 
million Kurds dispersed throughout Western and the majority of Kurdish 
migrants originate from Turkey (Baser, 20 II: 8). with the migration flows 
in the 1970s, Kurdish diaspora members set up in Europe that echoed 
the Kurdish political groups and organisations in Turkey and tried to become 
the voice of the Kurds who remained in the 
In the early 1980s, differently from the groups, the PKK (Kurdistan 
Workers' Party) engaged in an armed struggle the Turkish state. During 
the 1990s, it became the most visible Kurdish both in Turkey' and in 
Europe, and it surpassed the earlier groups that out various activities related 
to the Kurdish cause. While the PKK was su,;ces:WIJI in mobilising the masses and 
becoming a social movement with mass appeal in diaspora, the other Kurdish 
movements remained elite-initiatives, without substantial support (Baser, 
I For more infonnation on the PKK and how 
Kurdish movement see Cengiz Gunes (2012), The 
Protest to Resistance. London: Routledge. 
established hegemony over the 
Movement in Turkey: From 
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2011; 0stergaard-Nielsen, 2003). these organisation~: 
Association for Kurdish Workers Kurdistan), which wm, ••• 
of Kurdish associations in Europe. is affiliated transnatiM 
(Kurdish Socialist Party), and it itself from the r·· 
differing aims from the PKK 's po agenda and its rejecr: 
a means of reaching its aims for the .... u,, ... ,. ... cause. It was th1 
critic of the PKK' and still has a (van Bru:., 
Europe. It is currently affiliated with Kurdish political party H • 
founded in 2002 in Turkey. Gunter 11: 189) argues that sin;;~o' •· 
verge of adopting a non-violent of its own, the role ofK 
the Kurdish movements in the has been becoming ever 
In this chapter, I discuss the of KOMKAR in ,. 
contribute to the empirical on the Kurdish dia~r ' 
offer a new appreciation of the of the involver· · 
conflicts as well as in peace Today, KOMKAR i~ • 
organisation with a large member nor does it play a!"~: • 
Kurdish politics. Nevertheless, 's activities are itw' ' 
who conduct research on diasporas homeland conflict! .. , · 
that helps us highlight the h .. t.,.rnc7"" '"u" 
grOUpS, different aspectS Of diasp0ra 11\Vnho•p,m,Pnt 
the diversity of approaches to conflict rl>.,.nlnl~lnn 
using KOMKAR as a case study, I 
among different actors in 
at stake when it comes to the 
borders and, finally, how different 
'contradictory roles' (Smith, 2007: I 
of this contribution is not to provide m-cJeom 
process in Turkey; instead, by using 
to understand how various groups 
a diaspora group and how this tra,gmftntatuln 
conflicting strategies by each group t"'u""r'1" 
peace process. 
KOMKAR and its associated 
actors in the resolution process in , however, they can p'·"· 
Over the last five years, KOMKAR become more percep•:• ' 
and European political spheres ~,41u,,., they declared tt. ~· ·· 
dialogue with the Turkish government the so-called 'Kurdi:t ' 
corresponds to the AKP (Justice and wevetomne11t 
packages related to Kurdish rights in 
meetings about the new political ... u("'"''!f." in Turkey and soug.ht • 
wished to play a role in the and efforts to resoiH' •' 
in Turkey. The return of Kemal Turkey (their polit:M• 
in exile in Sweden) in order to in politics also~..,.; 
value. While they lost a considerable of their member 1.~ 
. KOMKAR(The 
e first federation 
lly with the PSK 
K line due to its 
m of violence as 
severest Kurdish 
sen, 2000) across 
~K-PARthatwas 
the PKK is on the 
:OMKAR among 
nore 'moribund'. 
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rtant for scholars 
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10litics as well as 
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Jding takes place 
iltered dynamics 
: beyond its own 
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The main motive 
the current peace 
ase study it aims 
purposes within 
,ra might lead to 
!II as a potential 
: not the primary 
a secondary role. 
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they are open to 
Opening', which 
~rnment's reform 
;ed seminars and 
to show that they 
he Kurdish issue 
I leader who was 
d some symbolic 
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the gravity of their activities is now carried to Turkey and the diaspora is 
refashioning itself and trying to adapt to (Baser, 20 11 ). 
This chapter is the result of different of fieldwork conducted in 
different European countries between 2009 20132 and data collection for 
this chapter also draws on secondary resources the websites of Kurdish 
organisations. In total, 20 in-depth face-to-face were conducted with 
the leaders ofKOMKAR branches in the (The Hague), France (Paris), 
Germany (Berlin), UK (London) and Sweden £Qtnl"1rhnlm). In order to capture a 
bigger picture, there were also several the members ofKOMKAR 
who were first and second generation diaspora 
Early academic research on diasporas and ict has focused primarily on 
examining the role of diasporas as spoilers of negotiations in homeland 
conflicts or on how they contribute to the of conflicts back in the 
homeland (Lyons, 2004; Demmers, 2007). D•""'"'r'•~ were described as long-
distance nationalist communities pursuing while taking advantage 
of the freedom and economic benefits that the land provides them (Anderson, 
1983). The view has been that by sending rem and channelling large funds 
through welfare organisations close to insurgent members of the diaspora 
have contributed to the escalation of conft icts than supporting constructive 
conflict resolution (Zunzer, 2005). For one of the mostly cited cases 
is the Tamil Diaspora. Large numbers of organisations and individuals, 
through the substantial transfer of remittances, the Tamil population 
living in the North-Eastern part of Sri Lanka, as as the organisations affiliated 
with the separatist movement (Zunzer, 2005). 
In a more balanced manner, emerging r~>~••<>rtlh also finds diasporas to be the 
critical agents of social, political and cultural in more constructive and 
less confrontational ways (Horst, 2007). It is that diasporas have been 
highly or partially effective in assisting confli transformation processes and 
actively engaged in post-conflict reconstruction · ities. There is an increasing 
belief that by lobbying governments, particularly host nations, and international 
organisations and by aiding the process of trans and reconstruction, diasporas 
are playing an increasingly important role in ng political compromise and 
peaceful conflict resolution in their homelands and Swain, 2007). They can 
have a positive political impact on peace-making human rights advocacy, 
2 The interviews were conducted in Sweden and as part of my PhD research 
at the European University Institute in Florence, between 2008 and 2012. Other 
interviews in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and were conducted in 2012- 13 
while a postdoc for the ERC project, 'Diasporas and crn,ntP<:t .. rt Sovereignty', University 
of Warwick. 
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by raising awareness among the hostland public and In addition, 
they can potentially provide direct political to pro-peace actors in the 
homeland, as well as participating in homeland peace-making initiatives as 
advisors (Baser and Swain, 2008). For example, the of Somalia is noteworthy, 
as remittances are of very high economic · domestically and much of 
the expertise and resources for sustaining the peace process come from 
the diaspora communities in the West (Koser and Hear, 2003: 9). 
While researching ways of sing diasporas, scholars 
acknowledge that diaspora groups are not entities, and therefore 
they should be discussed carefully by taking into different aspects such as 
ideological cleavages, class relations, gender and ous differences among the 
diaspora (Cochrane, Baser and Swain, 2009; 2007). As Galipo (2011: 8) 
argues 'there is always a plurality of voices the diasporas, especially 
when different waves of displacement are taken nto account. Fragmentation 
within diasporas often reflects the social and por division in the homeland'. 
Therefore, these divisions among different within the diaspora should 
also be embedded into any research that has to do ith diasporas' role in conflict 
and peace processes (Horst, 2007: 8). As such as Kleist (2007) and 
0stergaard-Nielsen (2003) argue, under certain divergent groups 
may form contingent alliances for a common goal their political, social and 
economic structures may remain fragmented. At new fractions within the 
same group may occur while in exile (Horst, It should also be taken into 
account that diasporas may shift from one stance to depending on changes 
in homeland politics. Different groups within a community might play 
moderate or marginal roles and sometimes may want to stay aloof from 
politics. Diasporas might have plural positions the homeland politics and 
depending on their political goals, they might different visions for political 
change in different phases of the conflict (Smith. 
When involving diaspora groups in conflict 
attention to two criteria: the diaspora group's ca,,aciti' 
homeland conflict (Freitas, 2012: 5). Some groups have higher motivations 
but lower capacities in terms of influencing peace es, while some others 
might be hesitant to act although they have a capacity to impact a 
peace process. There is usually no balance of the diaspora groups 
and their discursive or political spaces. The core matter comes to defining 
who represents the diaspora and if the presence fragmented groups within 
a diaspora can be detected, how to approach and involve them in policy 
mechanisms. Developing and organising prc)Ce:sseSI is harder for politicians, as 
well as third parties without considering these facts. the scholars who have 
highlighted this point, there is Horst (2007), who JJ•:.~,;u:..:.c:. 
within a diaspora community and how such fragmerttatu)ns 
parties tO include diasporas in development nr111iPrtc: 
Despite this abundance of research, the 
it comes to understanding diasporas and their invol 
still has shortcomings when 
in homeland conflicts. 
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To my understanding, the biggest gap in the stems from the fact that 
many scholars tend to focus solely on the I voice in the diaspora although 
they acknowledge the fact that diaspora groups heterogeneous. For instance, 
0stergaard-Nielsen (2006: 4) states: ' ( ... ] the are perceived as both peace 
wreckers and peacemakers. This is not least u"'~"'u'>"' they are heterogeneous in 
terms of political networks, an important of diaspora politics which is 
often glossed over as we tend to refer to the most I groups as the Kurdish, 
Croat or Sri Lankan diaspora'. There are not cient academic studies on the 
minor diaspora groups who are trying to find a of opportunity to raise 
their voice and therefore, their voices within the become even less visible 
in academic research. What we need to is that a diaspora is not a 
monolithic body with a shared approach to a n issue, but instead it has many 
diverse approaches that need to be taken into clearly besides analysing 
which groups want 'peace' and on 'what (Smith, 2007). Consequently 
diasporas' involvement in homeland conflicts ld be approached carefully by 
taking into account various factors such as the cleavages within the 
diaspora and how each group defines their ideal map for potential resolution 
(Cochrane, Baser and Swain, 2009). 
Transnational Mobilisation of KOMKAR in E 
Early Mobilisation Efforts and Activities 
Kurdish migration to Europe began with labour mi•:>-r~i·inn agreements between 
Turkey and various European states in the 1960s. The composition of 
Kurdish migrants changed dramatically when political situation in Turkey 
deteriorated (due to the oppression of the Kurd identity or leftist movements, 
coup d'etats, imprisonment and torture) and were large numbers of asylum 
seekers and undocumented migrants from the 1970s onwards - with ethnic 
organisations being established on the heels of incoming waves of Kurdish 
migrants (Khayati, 2008; Baser, 2011 ). My with one of the founders 
of KOMKAR in Germany reveals that by 1979 were already 30 Kurdish 
associations and in order to combine their organisations decided to 
form a new federation which was to be called KAR. Although it was not 
the original intention, KOMKAR members later to partner with Kemal 
Burkay's Kurdistan Socialist Party (PSK), which formed in 1974. The PSK 
was a political party (illegal in Turkey) affiliated ith the OzgUriUk Yolu (Road 
to Freedom) movement and it distanced itself the PKK line as it denounced 
the use of violence for political aims. The party a two-strategy solution to 
the Kurdish Question in Turkey: first, an status that would lead to 
federalism and, second, a unified socialist in the future (Gunter, 2011: 
189; van Bruinessen, 2000). KOMKAR usually people who sympathised 
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with the PSK. However, it was also a home for many Kurdish migrants who 
arrived in Europe and needed a place to gather and nd support. 
The Netherlands branch was founded in 1982 aimed at helping the Kurdish 
immigrants in the Netherlands to integrate into Dutch society whilst keeping 
their attachments to their homeland (Mugge, l 0: 115). Other KOMKAR 
branches in Sweden, the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland and 
Austria followed and PSK/KOMKAR became a political movement 
that acted with a 'dual agenda' 2003) starting from the 
beginning of the 1980s.3 KOMKAR decided to all its branches under 
a confederation in 2009 and founded , which is the umbrella 
organisation for KOMKAR branches in Europe. They organised the Newroz 
festivities (the first in 19764) attended by many migrants (Emanuelsson, 
2005: ll2; MUgge, 2010: 119). They engaged in c1i::lc:nr•ri~ activism by mobilising 
mass protests throughout Europe. For instance, was a 41-day hunger strike 
in 1981 organised by KOMKAR members in protesting against the coup 
d'etats in Turkey. After the hunger strike a small mittee went to Strasbourg to 
meet some representatives of the Council of to make the Kurdish voice 
heard in Europe. After the brutality inflicted on Kurds by Saddam Hussein's 
regime in the late 1980s, KOMKAR planned events in many European 
countries. The German branch of KOMKAR promoted a one-day hunger 
strike after the Halabja massacre. KOMKAR launched a mass protest 
and hunger strike in front of the UN in Bonn Turkey closed its borders to 
Kurdish refugees fleeing Iraqi Kurdistan because Saddam Hussein's regime's 
acts of genocide. At that time several campaigns send financial help to the 
Kurdish refugees were organised. 
KOMKAR offices worked on documenting the 
and published pamphlets aimed at informing 
public. Many books were published under 
also published and sent back to Turkey, and 
organised. In 1989, for example, KOMKAR 
Kurdish activists and European politicians together 
Rights in Kurdistan' in Bremen. In 1991, they 
Organisation Bureau headed by a KOMKAR 
to linguistic and cultural events (van Bruinessen, 
fairs took place in different German cities. In the 
to campaign for the linguistic rights of Kurdish 
1985 a campaign for the recognition of Kurdish as 
was launched (Emanuelsson, 2005: 113). The idea 
rights abuses in Turkey 
as well as the general 
difficulties, magazines were 
inars and conferences were 
managed to bring different 
a conference called 'Human 
a Kurdistan Human Rights 
They also gave priority 
Several Kurdish book 
1980s KOMKAR started 
be officially recognised as Kurds, a stateless nati 
ethnic identity. However, despite these ~-r<>""'"'"ti•nr.·<>l 
3 Bekir Topgider, 2009 [online). Available at: 
bereldk-yazilar/komkar_30yil.htm [Accessed 27 Novem 
4 Ibid. 
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the KOMKAR elite could not prevent their rro•l'lni1c::Minn 
Kurdish politics both in the diaspora and in 
Sectarian and Ethnic Outbidding in the 
Adamson (2013: 70) defines the process of nou~nult1 as involving: 'the use of 
violence, both as a means of demonstrating .......... nth and resolve, and as a way 
of marginalising more moderate alternative and argues that sectarian and 
ethnic outbidding can be included in the of many diaspora groups that 
are trying to disseminate their message to a constituency. According to 
Adamson (20 I 3: 70), the PKK has won the competition with other 
Kurdish groups so as to establish its hegem organisations that sympathise 
with the PKK line have managed to reach a segment of society, while 
KOMKAR's member base was perceived as consisting of 'intellectuals' 
(0stergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 63) but at the time as incapable of devising a 
strategy that would make their agenda a mass ovement. Although other Kurdish 
organisations, including KOMKAR, changed discourse to adjust to the new 
conjecture after the mid 1980s, the PKK had won over the diaspora Kurds 
and established its hegemony on the movement which was sustained 
through 'a combination of successful mobil and propaganda, the creation 
or co-optation of an extensive structure, as well as coercion' 
(Adamson, 2013: 80). As Burkay, currently 's leader, states: 
The PKK started to grow stronger. Then they 
of the PKK in Europe started to grow s 
weapons and weapons made noise. On the 
such as ours. started to Jose out when the 
arrested, imprisoned. and the democratic 
According to Burkay, the developments in the played a significant role 
in weakening the other Kurdish movements lling the PKK. Representatives 
that I interviewed in France, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands and Britain agreed 
with this statement. The representative of also adds that one of the reasons 
why KOMKAR became weaker was that members also lost faith in the 
PSK and joined the PKK instead. According the KOMKAR representative in 
Berlin, the PKK used violence against other movements andjeopardised 
the activities of KOMKAR in Europe. The two isations were operating side-
by-side in Germany and elsewhere, all the le competing against each other 
for the loyalties of the Kurdish diaspora. Semin organised by KOMKAR were 
sabotaged and raided by PKK supporters. r members were threatened or 
5 Interview with Mr Kemal Burk.ay. 2013, 
(ResearchTurkey), London [online]. Available 
[Accessed 27 November 2013]. 
Policy and Research on Turkey 
http://researchturkey.org/?p=2984 
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beaten. The rivalry between the two groups was 
affected their image badly in Europe. For 
Newroz celebration in Munich in 1987 and 
burned KOMKAR offices and archives.6 
e to the third parties and 
there was an attack during a 
this some PKK supporters 
The violent outbursts between the two groups also claimed/took the lives of 
several KOMKAR supporters, and left others · (Lyon and Ucarer, 2001: 
936). It is claimed that Ramazan Adiguzel, in and Ali Akagunduz- the 
chairman ofKOMKAR in France, were killed by PKK.7 Another tense episode 
was the Newroz celebration of 2003, when a organised by KOMKAR 
was sabotaged by PKK supporters who brought to an abrupt end by chanting 
slogans. In the last decade, there have not been major violent events noted 
between the two groups as KOMKAR's is now small and it does not 
represent a great threat to the PKK and its on the Kurdish movement. 
Both diaspora groups organise separate protests, and festivals and are not 
usually involved in joint projects. Although both aim at ameliorating the 
situation of Kurds in Turkey and Europe, there is consensus on how to achieve 
that goal. They usually contradict each other when comes to planning a road map 
for conflict resolution in Turkey and the lack of results in competition 
for a political space both in the homeland and in diaspora. 
New Outlooks and a New Centre of Gravity 
Their activities clearly show that KOMKAR to organise itself as a 
mobilised diaspora group since the 1980s. , due to the fact that their 
movement lost ground and was outbid by the there is a clear decay in 
their appeal to the larger constituency of the The current member base 
of KOMKAR consists of its founding members remain loyal to its political 
aims and strategies. The second-generation are usually the family 
members of PSK supporters who were born in . Recruitment from second-
generation Kurds is overwhelmingly low rnrnn~orl>t1 to the PKK's appeal to the 
second-generation Kurds in Europe (Baser, 2011 ). interviews with KOMKAR 
representatives revealed that the movement is active and wants to adapt to 
the new developments both in Turkey and in the The discourses of the 
KOMKAR members were very much not just with their compatriots 
from other countries but also with the political party discourse in 
Turkey. They have frequent meetings about politics since Kemal 
Burkay's return to Turkey and they are trying to HAK-PAR a political player 
in the resolution process. The interviewees that HAK-PAR was a 'non-
violent alternative' to the PKK and might as 
negotiations as well as in the Parliament. 
6 Topgider, 2009. 
7 Ibid. 
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Diasporas are not static and their behaviour can shaped by internal or external 
stimulants. The centre of gravity of their might shift back and forth 
between the homeland and the hostland ~Vt'V"~"''& on the political developments 
in both spaces (Brun and Van Hear, 2012: 63). Thi the case for KOMKAR; as 
the diaspora elite recognised the need to regain a to compete for discursive 
opportunities, they started to shift the gravity activities towards mobilising 
members in the homeland. As a diaspora group, are trying to revive an exile-
movement back in the homeland with an updated There was a recent party 
congress in Turkey and of the 1,500 members that around 200 were from 
the diaspora. The organisations are now col financial contributions for 
HAK-PAR from supporters in the diaspora and hope that their political party 
will once more gain significance in Turkey. A it was founded in diaspora, 
it is now aiming at becoming an actor also in homeland thanks to diasporic 
financial and political support. 
The ' Kurdish opening' launched in 2009, paved the way for the discussion of 
several issues previously considered taboo in However, it fell short of 
corresponding to the demands of the Kurdish in Turkey. At that time, 
KOMKAR made constant declarations of to the process while PKK-
related organisations were more cautious and optimistic in their comments. 
Initially the AKP government did not want to in an official dialogue with 
the PKK or with its diaspora organisations. at reaching the Kurdish 
population at home and abroad by bypassing PKK. As Galipo (2011: 19) 
argues sometimes divisions within the diaspora counterproductive for positive 
outcomes due to lack of joint efforts and · rivalries may act as a barrier in 
front of a more durable solution. In this process, ither was there any cooperation 
between the two Kurdish actors nor was there initiative from the homeland 
actors to unite them. 
In order to start cooperating with the Kurdi diaspora the AKP took several 
steps such as the opening of a dialogue with Burkay to secure his return to 
Turkey from exile. This was seen as surprising at time as the demands of the 
PSK were even more marginal than the PKK - the PSK wanted no less than 
a federal solution while the PKK maintained they did not want a separate 
state and opted for democratic autonomy in majority regions. Burkay was 
critical of the AKP but even more critical of the Therefore, his return roused 
suspicions about the real intentions of the AKP the reform process. While the 
Turkish government tried to bypass the PKK and affiliated organisations at the 
beginning of the 'Kurdish opening', KOMKAR liated organisations perceived 
it as a window of opportunity to put the HA back on the political scene 
in Turkey. KOMKAR has organised several ""'~'-' "'~;" in Europe with Turkish 
political actors in order to discuss the current of events in Turkey. Their 
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approach to the new developments was almost always 
PKK was arguing. This dichotomy revealed itself in 
The following two examples give an idea about 
the process: 
image of what the 
single development. 
different approaches to 
12 September 2010 Referendum: The referendum proposing a series of 
constitutional amendments. It aimed at changing the of the 1982 constitution, 
which was prepared in the aftermath of the coup d' in 1980, but at the same 
time strengthening the AKP and its rule. The Kurdish party close to the 
PKK line declared they would boycott the referendum the amendments 
did not sufficiently improve the rights of the Kurdish population - as they do 
not change anything that the Kurds demanded such as tongue education 
in Kurdish. KOMKAR, however, organised a meeting in order to 
discuss the referendum process. According to several websites, over 60 
big names in Kurdish politics in exile in Europe in the meeting. At the 
end of the conference, a declaration was released that voting 'yes' to the 
referendum is to vote in favour of the Kurds and the and that voting 'no' 
can only bring hardship to the Kurds in the long run.8 PKK-related diaspora 
organisations boycotted the conference organised by and issued a 
press release stating their belief that this conference 
theAKP.9 
Peace Conference in Brussels in 2013: In the course the peace process the 
Turkish side understood that there is a need for more ~011cr·ete steps in order to 
reach a resolution on the Kurdish Question and the Process', a procedure 
involving talks between the PKK and the Turkish Intelligence agency, 
was secretly launched. This was later leaked to the in 20 II and brought no 
concrete results; however, it was a sign that the Turkish was now addressing 
the primary actor of the Kurdish movement, the PKK. current peace process 
(since 2012) has seen talks between Kurdish MPs and imprisoned leader of the 
PKK, and there are continuous talks between the intelligence and the 
PKK and its leader. With HAK-PAR feeling sidelined Turkey throughout this 
new process, KOMKAR organised a conference in Germany, in April 
20 13 to discuss current developments and the of a peaceful resolution. 
At the end of the conference, there was a that stated that they are 
content with the end of violence between the PKK and Turkish Army; however 
they have doubts concerning the transparency of this .10 Moreover, 
8 Declaration by KOMKAR EU, 29 August 2010. 
9 Diaspora Kurt Konferansi toplaniyor [online). "''·"'""u'" at: http://www.nasnarne. 
com/a!diaspora-kurd-kooferansi-toplaniyor [Accessed 27 2013]. 
10 Diaspora Toplantisi Sonuc Bildirisi [online). at: http://www.kurdistan-
aktuel.org/haberler/30-avrupa/12264-d ldirisi.html [Accessed 27 
November 2013). 
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during the peace talks, the PKK leader asked for a 'peace conference' 
organised by the Kurdish diaspora in Brussels, ich was held in summer 2013. 
Many Kurdish diaspora organisations as well Turkish leftist, Armenian, and 
Assyrian organisations participated in the ce which KOMKAR boycotted. 
These two examples clearly show that the two main actors of the Kurdish 
diaspora had different motivations and concerning their approach to the 
resolution of the homeland conflict. Both to get involved in the peace 
process but they were not on equal terms. In th case, the PKK fu lfilled the two 
criteria in terms of capacity and motivation 2012) while KOMKAR had 
the motivation but lacked the capacity to · the course of events back in 
the homeland. The Turkish side, however, negotiating with KOMKAR; as 
soon as they discovered their lack of capacity influence a significant number 
of Kurds in Turkey, they had to target the for potential peace talks. While 
trying to get diaspora groups engaged in related issues from peace-
building to development, scholars suggest a common ground needs to be 
found to unifY diaspora efforts (Horst, 2007). inclusion of diaspora groups 
in this important process was conducted and not in a systematic way. 
The Turkish government addressed the groups interchangeably and not 
simultaneously while playing them one against and increasing its leverage 
throughout the negotiations. In addition to that, the organisations supporting 
the PKK line and KOMKAR tried to sideline other during this process rather 
than trying to cooperate on a common ground they could use to push the 
Turkish government towards reform. 
Conclusion 
The growing literature on diasporas' inv•~•v••.m••nrlnt1 homeland conflicts and peace 
processes shows that diasporas can influence host and homelands and their 
transnational activism in their respective host might affect political, 
social and economic developments. Although this an emerging field of research, 
there is still much to discover in relation to role they play under which 
circumstances. This chapter sought to provide on this topic by focusing on 
the heterogeneous structure of diaspora groups how this fragmentation affects 
their engagement with homeland political actors. s shown, diasporas are multi-
layered and include various actors with different and strategies. 
The case of KOMKAR perfectly the complexity of diaspora 
engagement in homeland conflicts and peace as well as the wide-range 
of actors and motives that should be considered. shows that each diverse group 
within a diaspora group has different strategies aims, which relate to conflict 
resolution in the homeland. There can be groups play a leading role within 
a given diaspora and who are considered as the · of a diaspora in 
general. However each group within a diaspora, the lack of its capacity, 
might have motivations and expectations and can as an independent actor with 
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agency. As this case study has demonstrated, there is considerable outbidding 
process among conflicting groups that ensues in space which paves 
the way for shifts of power between different actors in diaspora and a diaspora 
group might lose ground over time due to the "'ucu•s•P in the homeland politics 
and actors. The efforts of revealing KOMKAR's over Kurdish politics 
through HAK-PAR also indicates that due to the developments in 
the homeland the gravity of mobilisation can oscillate between the 
homeland and hostland. 
secondary actors might What has emerged from this research also confirms 
also play a role throughout the conflict cycle and 
approach to diaspora groups and their impact. The 
conflict resolution will only be fully acknowledged 
research on the less visible and more silent groups 
when a more comprehensive range of actors is taken 
needs to have a broader 
that diasporas can play in 
scholars also conduct 
a given diaspora and 
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